No. You are avoiding the subject, and talking nonsense, in terms of verification/PGP/security. This concern is not unfounded, and the fact that you do not see it (or pretend not to) is even more concerning, like making excuses. The concern I raised is fundamental, and also completely unaddressed. If the release is not signed by the same key that signed the last several releases (which, again, is B493319106CC3D1F252E19CBF806F422E222AA02), then the concern is very well founded that the same team is not working on this fix.
This is very standard PGP security/verification, and Bisq has a history of making light of this, and it has already caused problems for the trust Bisq enjoys. For example you can see how the Whonix team responds to the previous gpg failure here: Bisq: The P2P Exchange Network
But this time when the exploit is so recent, if Bisq fails to use the proper key (which in this case is B493319106CC3D1F252E19CBF806F422E222AA02, not HenrikJannsen’s key, although it’s fine to also use that - provided it is signed by Alejandro’s key, above), after a big exploit, it would erode trust in Bisq. This is proper because you would be breaking the basic PGP verification principles at a moment of crisis, so what else should people think?
I will not focus on the issue of the message in Bisq regarding the new version, because (a) I address that in another thread Bisq Exploit Update 2 - #11 by suddenwhipvapor) and (b) if the GPG key (B493319106CC3D1F252E19CBF806F422E222AA02) is used to sign the new version, we can have some confidence that the message was just poor phrasing in the heat of the moment. But if that key is not used, there should be no trust left in Bisq, considering the gravity of the exploit.